DMA Economics, LLC
is a world class provider of Valuation Analyses
in high-stakes litigation. Their clients include billion-dollar investment funds under SEC investigation as well multi-national firms involved in intellectual property disputes, consumers in product mislabeling cases, and small to mid-sized businesses involved in complex commercial litigation.
DMA Economics has performed valuations for cases involving Theft of Trade Secrets, Securities Fraud, Product Mislabeling and Consumer Fraud, and Lost Profits and Enterprise Value
to name a few.
DMA Economics also has extensive experience in the valuation of business interests for non-litigation matters. These include but are not limited to valuations of non-public business interests, for acquisition and regulatory purposes.
Donald M. May PhD, CPA
, Managing Partner at DMA Economics, LLC, possesses over 30 years of Valuation and Economic Damages
experience. He implements a broad range of damage analyses and valuations for clients including billion dollar investment funds under SEC investigation as well as smaller businesses concerned with the impact of potential litigation and strategies to reduce potential liability.
- Prior to founding DMA Economics LLC, Dr. May was Managing Director at Berkley Research Group and the Principal in charge of valuation and litigation support services for a regional accounting firm, a Managing Director for PricewaterhouseCoopers, and a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Management. He has performed over 200 valuations of closely held businesses across numerous industries for financial reporting and estate planning.
Dr. May has been published in several distinguished academic and practitioner journals such as The Journal of Finance, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Hedge Fund Law Review
, and is currently an editorial board member of The Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis
View Donald May's Expert Witness Profile
Benchmarks are the basis for damages. But when the assumptions behind the benchmarks fail to stand up to Daubert scrutiny, expert testimony may be excluded.
This article finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers consider personal risk when making decisions that affect firm risk. I find that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with more personal wealth vested in firm equity tend to diversify. CEOs who are specialists at the existing technology tend to buy similar technologies. When specialists have many years vested, they tend to diversify, however. Poor performance in the existing lines of business is associated with movements into new lines of business.