Counter-Drone Defense, Negligent Security and Premises Liability

As many of our readers know, I have a keen interest in all things state-of-the-art technology. From software-as-a-service (SaaS) in the legal technology and legal AI spaces, to Blockchain, and robotics, I have always enjoyed following advancements at the edge. For this article, we’re going to add Air Defense as a Service (ADaaS).

Furthermore, I’m an old political science student (and new national security graduate-student because I’m not great at hobbies) who has always followed international relations, foreign developments, and military deployments with a fervor, despite its disconnection to my daily work.

About four years ago, I began following the Ukraine War. As the war has progressed, so too has defense technology and military hardware. When I say progress, I mean we are now facing some of the most advanced, low cost, and easily available military hardware seen in my lifetime. Probably yours too.

Drones! Drones have changed warfare forever. Military drones have been around for a long time. I first became aware of them when the US used Predator drones back in 2001 in Afghanistan. I’m here to tell you they have changed. They are cheaper, more readily available, and capable of causing great damage.

The product lines are also vastly more diversified. There are drones for everything (or what is called multi-domain). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) include tactical and low altitude drones; medium altitude long endurance; high altitude long endurance; kamikaze drones; heavy lift; and collaborative combat drones. There are also unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs); unmanned surface vehicles (USVs); and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). There’s more, but you get the point.

In this article, we focus on UAVs which are the most readily available to US consumers in what are termed commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) drones. They also pose the biggest threat now.

We have evidence from the Ukraine and Iran wars. Drones have stopped larger, more advanced militaries in their tracks. Ukraine has used drones to stop Russia’s advancement and is now regularly striking energy, distribution, and other infrastructure in and near Moscow.

Iran’s use of drones caused great difficulty for the US military this year. Iranian drones, paired with missiles, caused considerable damage to US bases and allied nations in the Middle East. Requiring the US to spend considerable time and treasure intercepting missiles and drones.

At this point, you may be wondering, “Nick! What does all of this have to do with premises liability and civilian drone defense?”

Excellent question! I’m glad you asked. I have given you that introduction to discuss the growing risk from drones and how it applies to our present and future civil defense. I hope to convey the message that gaps exist for private parties to defend their premises. Further, gaps exist to limit liability.

What is the Threat to the Civilian Sector?

Some of you are probably wondering if there is any real threat to the private sector. There probably isn’t a serious threat to you and your home. Many of the soft targets in smaller towns could be safe. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), under the Department of Homeland Security, defines soft targets as “locations or environments that are easily accessible, attract large numbers of people on a predictable or semi-predictable basis, and may be vulnerable to attacks using simple tactics and readily available weapons.” However, huge aspects of civil litigation come from events that occur on real property. Slip and fall in the grocery store; physical assault in a nightclub or bar; injured by falling products; negligent or inadequate security; negligent hiring and training of security. Almost all which lodge into the area of law termed “premises liability.”

Homeland security reviews security needs of events and locations based on the SEAR (Special Event Assessment Rating) framework, which was brought to my attention by Dan Anixt, former General Counsel of Dedrone (now an Axon company). They then apply a numerical score for the events between 1 and 5. Here’s their own example of the top 5.

• SEAR 1 includes events of significant national and/or international importance and may require extensive federal interagency support.
• Examples: Super Bowl, major marathons (e.g., Boston), Rose Bowl.
• SEAR 2 includes events with national and/or international importance and may require some national level federal support.
• Examples: Las Vegas New Year's Eve, Indianapolis 500, Kentucky Derby.
• SEAR 3 includes events of national and/or international importance and requires only limited federal support.
• Examples: National Cherry Blossom Festival Parade, Master Golf Tournament, Oklahoma City Memorial Marathon.
• SEAR 4 includes events of limited national importance and are handled at the state and local level.
• Examples: State fairs, festivals, and markets.
• SEAR 5 includes events that may be nationally recognized but generally have only state and local importance. Support is normally managed at the local level.
• Examples: Varsity baseball and football home games, agricultural festivals, craft shows and other local events.

Federal law enforcement will have counter-UAS (counter unmanned aerial systems a.k.a. cUAS) applications to deploy against drone threats. As an example, the FBI seized more than 600 drones flying near World Cup venues. The majority of those were hobbyist drones. That won’t be the case forever.

For this article, we’re looking at softer targets. SEAR 4, SEAR 5, and below. My interest lies in those places where litigation is bound to arise.

• Fairs, festivals, open-air markets
• Local concerts, theaters, and nightclubs
• Amazon warehouses, distribution and logistics centers
• High school and college sporting events
• Midsize apartment complexes and hotels in cities like SF, NY, Chicago, and Capitol cities.
• Apartment, hotel, and office building open rooftops, etc.

Most of the lawsuits that pass through the doors of Experts.com, in search of expert witnesses, take place in the day-to-day locations above. SEAR 1 through SEAR 3 events and locales are going to have substantial local, state and federal resources protecting attendees and invitees from danger.

Assuming your property doesn’t fit the highest levels for event security, what are the options to keep your property or event secure?

The Counter-Drone Protocols

There are a couple of noted protocols for Counter-UAS applications. Some call it “Detect, Identify, Defeat (DID).” Others, such as this Dedrone white paper, refer to it as “Detect, Identify, Track, and Defeat/Mitigate.” We’ll use the latter for this paper.

At present, the US civilian sector is only able to detect, identify, and track potential drones coming near their facility. They are unable to defeat or mitigate the threat, and you’ll understand why shortly. The Dedrone white paper outlines these options with clarity from the point of view of the counter-drone operator:

• Detecting: “Counter-UAS systems are used to alert the operator that a drone is in a designated warning zone. These detection systems can be fixed on site or portable, depending on the needs of the operator. They use various detection technologies, including radar, optical and acoustics.”
• Think of this option as sensors, like sensors on doors and points of entry in your existing security alarm system. Or your security cameras.

• Tracking: “Once a drone is detected, a counter-drone solution may have the capability to track the path of the drone as well as the location of the pilot, providing airspace situational awareness to the operator.”
• This is largely like existing security guards who can observe and report activity at your property. Just like security cameras watching visitors in real time.

• Identifying: “When a counter-UAS system identifies a drone signature, the operator can then label a drone as friend or foe, allowing authorized drones to continue functioning without interruption from the C-UAS. The system can also identify the model of the drone, giving security personnel information about the range, speed and payload capabilities of the drone in their airspace.”
• This is more akin to the security camera recording that you hand over to police because it shows a person of interest or make and model of an automobile. Potentially even a still shot of a license plate.

• Defeating or mitigating: “Drones may be repelled or intercepted using mitigation technologies. Interference signals, for example, might interfere with the drone's operation. Active countermeasures include jamming devices that attempt to disrupt drone communications, missile interception systems designed to bring down uncrewed aircraft, and high-power lasers capable of temporarily blinding or disabling the drone operators.”
• There are more mitigation techniques, but it’s best if you picture this as those rare occasions where you have armed security at your premises, and they may be authorized to use force in certain situations.

Defeat or Mitigation Approaches

There are two basic subgroups of defeating and mitigating a drone incursion. What the defense industry refers to as effects (effectors depending on the type of product). Effects and effectors feel a little strange to those of us in the legal world, but it makes perfect sense.

Basically, counter-drone systems must have an effect upon the incoming drone. Whether it jams a radiofrequency, disrupts a motor, interferes with sensors or visuals, or shoots the drone out of the sky with a missile (or drone), these products all “effect” a drone’s ability to fly or reach its target. Effects are non-kinetic and those that are kinetic. D-Fend Solutions, has an excellent counter-UAS glossary from which we get the following definitions:

• Non-kinetic effectors:
• “Airspace security solutions that counter drone threats without using physical force, projectiles, nets, lasers, or high-power microwave systems. By avoiding physical impact, these solutions reduce the risk of falling debris, structural damage, or secondary hazards in crowded urban areas, stadiums, and airports.”

• Kinetic effectors:
• “Physical defense methods that disable or destroy unauthorized drones using projectiles, nets, lasers, high-power microwaves, or direct impact. While traditional in open military battlefields, kinetic approaches present significant risks in urban areas, stadiums, and airports, due to falling structural debris, secondary hazards, and potential collateral damage.”

Now you can understand why civilians cannot defeat or mitigate a drone, right? Many of the defeat/mitigate options carry risks to life, property, and aviation. It’s sort of the same idea as not firing guns into the air on the Fourth of July. You don’t know where the bullets are going to come down and what damage they’re going to do.

You cannot have Bob, from three houses down, firing into the air at a drone he doesn’t like. Furthermore, many of the non-kinetic effectors such as GPS disruption, jamming, lasers and microwave systems, all carry some risk to aviation. Most of the time we think of planes and jets as aviation, and that is largely the concern. However, drones (UAVs) are considered aircraft.

It would be bad for Bob to shoot at, hack, jam, crash or otherwise attempt to defeat a drone over his property because federal law classifies UAVs as aircraft. The Aircraft Sabotage Act (18 USC § 32), holds citizens responsible if they try to destroy or damage aircraft. There are also going to be state laws that apply and prevent you from causing damage to a drone.

If you ask me, the interference with a drone is less concerning than if you fire kinetic effector laser at a UAV, miss, but bring down a jet airliner flying further afield from the drone.

I made up “Bob from three houses down,” but I didn’t make up the laser story. That happened in February of 2026 in the airspace near Fort Hancock, Texas. US Customs and Border Patrol operated in military airspace near Fort Hancock. Flight coordination protocols between agencies failed, and the US military utilized a high energy laser to shoot down the CBP drone. This incident required a temporary shutdown of airspace. Also, it took place a couple of weeks after the CBP had shot down some party balloons requiring a temporary closure of El Paso’s airspace.

Luckily, no passenger jets were harmed in these instances that probably border on incompetence. Nevertheless, you can see why we cannot have defeat or mitigation effectors in the hands of untrained civilians. It was already dangerous enough in the hands of allegedly trained government agents.

How Does a Property Owner/Manager, or Security Operation Keep Their Premises Safe From a Drone Attack?

Bottom line, based on current laws and regulations, a property owner, property manager, and private security firm are limited in what they can do to protect property and invitees from a drone attack.

Massive stadiums are some of the best defended civilian properties in the US and maintain counter-UAS capabilities. Additionally, as SEAR 1 or 2, those events are going to have a combination of federal, state, and local resources with counter drone capabilities available to protect crowds at critical venues. Naturally, the federal agencies will have non-kinetic and kinetic effector capabilities.

High Rise Apartment Complex or Office Building Hypothetical

Now imagine being the property owner/ manager of a high-rise (generally 7 stories or above) apartment or office building that has a beautiful rooftop common area. Your rooftop has all the amenities. Seating, lounges, communal tables, fire pits, heaters, greenspace, outdoor kitchen, and built-in bar. It’s available for tenants or to be rented for special events like launch parties, weddings, and other celebrations. It’s got a relatively common occupancy rate of somewhere between 100 and 200 people. This is what is referred to as a soft target.

Recall the CISA definition of soft targets: “locations or environments that are easily accessible, attract large numbers of people on a predictable or semi-predictable basis, and may be vulnerable to attacks using simple tactics and readily available weapons.” I suspect calendars to reserve rooftop common areas are readily available online. Making events on rooftops predictable.

If you are the property owner / manager of the high-rise outlined above, your rooftop is a soft target. An attack no longer requires the attacker to visit your property. They can fly a COTS drone(s), with explosives attached, from the street below or from nearby rooftop and cause mayhem, injuries, death, and property damage.

The Distribution Center or Warehouse Hypothetical

Next, picture being an owner or operator of a large industrial distribution center (think Amazon fulfillment center). The building covers several hundred thousand square feet, with dozens of loading docks, a trailer yard, and a parking lot, and regular shift changes. Hundreds of employees, visitors, and vendors enter and exit the premises every day. You have a guard shack at specific entrances, cameras inside and outside the facility, badge readers for employees and visitors, etc. All those security measures assume the threat or prospective liability arrives via ground.

A drone can fly over your perimeter fence, however above the trailer yard or parking lot, and drop something to induce panic or cause an explosion at shift change. Drone use doesn’t have to be explosive or terroristic in nature either. What if someone is just conducting some surveillance for corporate espionage or cargo theft?

More concerning is what we’ve seen with Wildberries (Russia’s largest online retailer) distribution centers in Russia. These distribution centers are large parts of the supply chain, so attackers looking to cause economic disruption and civil unrest could target these centers for destruction.

Adding wrinkles to the distribution center issues, many of them now have their own drone operations for drone delivery. That makes the ability to detect, track, and identify especially important.

The High School Football Stadium Hypothetical

Finally, imagine you are the facilities administrator for a school district responsible for the Friday night football game. Many high school football facilities can be filled with thousands of people. The stadium is open-air, brightly lit, and depending on the importance of the game, the stands may be packed tightly. Security is probably staffed with school resource officers, maybe the local PD sends a couple officers, and there are parents volunteering. Maybe some added for-hire security services. Pretty textbook soft target.

There doesn’t need to be an intentional drone threat in this instance. Drones could be flown by parents, student AV club, hobbyists. A signal loss, battery failure, or careless pilot could send a drone crashing into the stands and causing a physical injury.

The worst-case scenario is someone using this to cause an attack. I refer to Dan Anixt’s comment to me that an attacker does not have to use an explosive. Imagine the drone drops a white powder causing panic and a stampede at a stadium, for example. Fears of anthrax or some other dangerous substance could simply frighten the large crowd into causing injury.

Resulting Lawsuits

If an attack against the rooftop party, distribution center, or high school stadium occurred, it will result in lawsuits against the premises owner, property manager, security firm, and any other tangentially related but potential defendants.

I’m not advocating for the lawsuits, but where damage and injury occur, even if it’s from an intervening and superseding third party (i.e., a criminal drone attacker), the lawsuits will follow.

Premises liability and negligent security are likely to be claimed as causes of action. Now, as Dan Anixt told me in our phone conversation while I was researching this article, “the fact property owners are not permitted to defeat or mitigate a drone attack, is a potential defense to liability for failing to defeat the attack.” The law prevents them from doing something, so it becomes a defense against liability because using drone mitigation technology (whose use is strictly limited to certain law enforcement and military) is a legal impossibility.

The Gaps in Protection: How do Civilians Limit Liability, Injuries, and Property Damage?

Detect, track, and identification of drones combined with hardening of facilities, I expect, will become customary practice for premises and security operations selling their services to property owners.

The apartment complex, office building, distribution center, or high school stadium (which can still hold quite a few people), are currently unable to stop a drone from doing damage intentionally or unintentionally. I don’t expect the laws will magically change, allowing civilians the ability to defeat or mitigate drone threats, unless the United States is actively engaged warfare within our borders.

Most of us do not want “Bob from three houses down,” the local Amazon on-site security guard, or school resource officer making decisions to take down aerial threats to those facilities. That only increases liability for those facility operators and owners.

Consider also, law enforcement agencies, with their qualified and government immunities. They are sued all the time for use of force. Those suits will continue when local law enforcement becomes responsible for local c-UAS response and defense resulting in injury, death, or property damage.

Detect, Track, Identify Analogous To Security Alarms, Guards and Cameras

Most commercial insurance policies do not have security requirements (alarms, guards and cameras), unless you are in an industry with high-value or high-theft inventory or other specific high-risk circumstances. However, most insurers do offer premium discounts if you have security precautions.

Not only do alarms, guards, and cameras offer premium discounts, these security options also mitigate risk and help to provide evidence in liability claims for the property owner when claims arise.

I contend that the drone defense systems allowing property owners or security operations to detect, track, and identify drones will soon be treated as the standard of care in premises safety and security matters.

Think of the detect, track, and identify as similar to the Ring or traffic cameras. It may one day assist authorities in learning where the drone, which caused damage or injury, originated.

Your drone defense system at your property detects a drone flying nearby and begins detecting the drone giving you data on which direction it came from. Then the system tracks the UAS. The tracking of a drone looks at its position, velocity, heading, acceleration, and deceleration. Think of the video you’ve seen of an auto accident. The traffic camera didn’t prevent the accident, but it gives a record of the incident.

In the military drone defense systems, which I believe will have dual use in commercial settings when the prices come down, the tracking goes deeper. Searching for clues about identity via signatures and looking for behavior and potential intent (i.e., is this a criminal, terrorist, spy, or hobbyist).

The identity or identification of the UAS is unlikely to be done by a property owner or operator. Instead, you’ll hand over detect and track data to authorities, who will have more tools at their disposal to find out who operated the technology and may have been the cause of the accident or incident.

Hardening Properties and Soft Targets

As I do when drafting these articles at the edge, I crowdsource ideas on LinkedIn. I’m grateful for it because I know the limitations of my own knowledge. I am not in the cUAS business every day. I read, but I do not get to see the application and rapid advancements.

So, when I considered what else property owners can do to limit damage, limit injury, accidents, or more nefarious actions, I needed insights from those in the trenches.

Joe Freedman, CEO of Dronazon Corporation a subsidiary of Red Cat Holdings, commented on my post. He explained that the civilian sector cannot defeat or mitigate but, they can harden their facilities.

You have seen hardening on the battlefield in Ukraine, if you have seen highways, vehicles, and buildings covered by netting or other overhead cover. I suspect we will begin seeing commercial netting over some of these soft targets I’ve described. Naturally, the designs will be made visibly appealing.

Back to our rooftop example. Imagine adding some netting on the rooftop to prevent access to the rooftop by UAVs. Heck, it might even dissuade pigeons, and there’s no building owner against that benefit. In my mind, this type of hardening security measure would be analogous to window restrictors in hotel rooms. Or RFID badges restrict access to certain parts of a building. Netting would serve a similar purpose.

For those property owners who do not like the appearance of netting, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) will probably create more aesthetically pleasing overhead hardening options. Immediately, I turn to a lattice patio cover or lattice roof. It provides some shade, overhead cover, and looks more visibly pleasing.

Granted, that works for a rooftop common area, but probably not financially practical for a large high school football stadium. Those will probably require some netting and tilt-up roof coverage over the stands. Maybe a combination of both.

The last item described by Joe Freedman was “shelter-in-place” plans. We don’t need to go into a lot of depth on this. If every business, school, or place of work requires an employee handbook, AI policy, and active shooter policy, they will also need a counter-drone policy which will likely include sheltering-in-place.

Which expertise will be used in these eventual lawsuits?

Well, as you can tell, I’ve spent time on the issues of premises liability and security or security guard operations. Those will be the go-to expert witnesses in these cases.

However, it is a little more complicated than your straightforward premises liability issue. Drones are aircraft. Existing experts on premises liability and security focus on ground operations.

Who is the expert in the air over the premises? What happens when aircraft engage in a negligent or intentional act? We might have to add aviation experts to the mix. But is the standard plane or airline aviation expert appropriate for drones? Probably not. I suspect that lawsuits are going to require drone pilots with security expertise. With this, we forge a new area of expertise.

Conclusion

Drones have changed the battlefield, are changing the delivery world, and soon enough the civilian experience. Property owners, managers, and security firms now face a threat that comes over the fence (or over the building) rather than through the back door, yet federal law leaves them with only part of the counter-drone playbook. They can detect, track, and identify a drone, but they cannot defeat or mitigate it. It may give defendants a powerful argument that they cannot be held liable for failing to do what the law forbids, but it will not shield them from claims that they ignored the precautions they could have taken.

Those precautions are taking shape now: detection and tracking systems that work like cameras for the sky, physical hardening such as netting and lattice overhead cover, and shelter-in-place plans that sit alongside active shooter policies. As costs come down, I expect courts and insurers to treat these measures as the standard of care, and the owners who adopt them early will be better protected, both physically and legally.

For attorneys, the lesson is to start thinking about the airspace above the premises. For experts, there is an opening for a new specialty that blends drone operations with security practice.

And this is only the aerial threat. While writing this article, I came across a robot dog patrolling an apartment complex. Ground drones have arrived too, and they may supplement your security guard operations, but that is an article for another time.

This article is for general information and is not legal advice. Experts and counsel should consult the applicable rules of professional conduct and the standing orders of the specific court where they appear.